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Abstract: We develop a general theory for the emergence of minority governments in multi-
party parliamentary systems using a bargaining model in the tradition of Baron and Ferejohn, 1989.
We show that generically (i.e. except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero in the space of the model’s
parameters) minority governments form with strictly positive probability when oﬃce utility from
cabinet positions is small relative to political disagreement. The result holds for policy spaces of
arbitrary ﬁnite dimension and a general class of preferences over the government agreements space.
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11. INTRODUCTION
The formation of minority governments in parliamentary systems constitutes one of the most
intriguing paradoxes in the study of coalition building. Parliamentarism operates on the funda-
mental principle that the executive’s survival in oﬃce hinges on the (tacit) support of a majority
in parliament. Yet, by deﬁnition, minority governments obtain majority support by allocating
cabinets to a set of parties with only a minority of seats in parliament. Why do political parties
support (or tolerate) minority governments without receiving cabinet oﬃce?
The nature of this paradox has been elegantly articulated in game theoretic analyses dating
to William Riker’s, 1962, pioneering study of coalition formation. Since Riker’s work there has been
a plethora of contributions focused on parliamentary government formation, including theories for
the formation of minority governments. A starting point for all extant explanations of minority
administrations is the assumption that political parties participating in coalition negotiations have
heterogeneous preferences over the public policies to be pursued by the prospective government.
Casual empiricism would leave little doubt as to the validity of this assumption.
But, aside from public policies, coalition negotiations also determine the distribution of cab-
inet posts (number as well as responsibilities of portfolios, etc.) among bargaining parties. The
attainment of cabinet oﬃce is the apex of a successful political career for most political actors in-
volved directly or indirectly in coalition negotiations. Thus, it is natural to assume that bargaining
parties prefer larger shares of cabinet positions. Indeed, minority governments are “paradoxical”
only if we entertain the latter assumption. Yet, there is no comprehensive theory of minority gov-
ernments that reconciles the incidence of such governments with the foundations of the paradox,
i.e. t h ef a c tt h a tc a b i n e to ﬃce to be distributed in government negotiations is desirable. Our goal
in the sequel is to develop such a theory.
Can we explain minority governments while (a) making the allocation of cabinet oﬃce among
political parties an explicit choice during government negotiations, (b) assuming that political
parties’ utility increases with more cabinet oﬃce, and (c) without undue restrictions on the policy
space over which political parties bargain? We show that the answer to this question is almost
always in the aﬃrmative. Minority governments emerge with positive probability when political
2disagreement or policy polarization among bargaining parties is marked relative to the ‘spoils’ of
oﬃce associated with holding cabinet positions. On the other hand, when utility from holding
cabinet oﬃce is signiﬁcant relative to policy disagreement, only majority governments form. The
result is independent of the number of political parties represented in parliament (assuming none
controls a majority of seats) or the number of dimensions of the underlying policy space.
We qualify the statement of our theory by almost always because it is possible to construct
otherwise unspectacular examples in which the stated comparative static does not hold. In partic-
ular, in these examples minority governments do not form independent of the importance of utility
from cabinet positions relative to political disagreement. Although these examples do not prove
detrimental to our further theorizing, they make it plain that the puzzle of minority governments
is not automatically resolved simply by admitting a mix of oﬃce and policy motivations for the
parliamentary parties that bargain over governments.3
Our analysis is not foreclosed by these counter-examples because we are able to show that
they are not generic. Thus, by almost always we mean that the set of cases in which the stated
comparative static does not hold has measure zero in the space of parameters. To put it otherwise,
if we imagine diﬀerent realizations of the world are drawn probabilistically from this space of
parameters, there is probability one that the advertised property holds. In eﬀect, rather than being
paradoxical, minority governments are a regular equilibrium phenomenon.
Our theory is consonant with one of the earliest accounts (subsequently neglected) of the
phenomenon to appear in the comparative politics literature (e.g. Dodd, 1976), according to which
minority governments emerge when bargaining parties are too polarized. In these explanations,
though, the connection between policy polarization and minority governments is almost assumed.
It amounts to an inability of polarized parties to participate in the same cabinet. Furthermore,
minority governments of that ﬂavor are expected to be of short duration (e.g. Powell, 1982, page
142). While there are numerous conceivable mechanisms to link policy polarization with minority
governments, our result is premised on the following.
Imagine government negotiations such that, due to exogenous restrictions, parties bargain
3The penalty we pay for these counter-examples is that we are forced to pursue abstract argu-
ments from diﬀerential topology and global analysis.
3over public policies but cannot distribute any of the cabinet posts among them. At the heart of our
result is the fact that the policy compromises reached in this counter-factual situation are (almost
always) diﬀerent from those reached by majority coalitions. The latter policy compromises diﬀer
because the tenure of cabinet posts among all participating parties allows eﬃcient trades between
policies and oﬃce. By invoking a continuity property of the associated bargaining game (Banks and
Duggan, 2000), we show that even when cabinet oﬃce is available for distribution among parties
but utility from holding this oﬃce is relatively unimportant, equilibrium policy compromises must
be diﬀerent from the eﬃcient compromises of majority coalitions. As a consequence, we deduce
that when cabinet oﬃce utility is small relative to policy disagreements, equilibrium minority
governments emerge.
Our ﬁnding is consistent with both systematic empirical evidence and stylized facts about
the incidence of minority governments. For example, minority governments are more likely in
Scandinavian countries where political disagreement is marked, a series of norms and institutional
restrictions limit the spoils that political parties can extract from the tenure of cabinet positions,
and ministerial oﬃce is relatively less signiﬁcant. If we compare systems with similar levels of
party fractionalization, minority governments were signiﬁcantly more common in Denmark than
pre-reform Italy, where cabinet oﬃce has been associated with the accrual of signiﬁcant spoils.
Lastly, in a large n study, Warwick, 1998, shows that minority governments are more likely to form
when policy polarization increases.
Of course, ours is not the only theory of minority governments, and other theories may
operate in conjunction or to complement our arguments. Before we move to the presentation of our
analysis, we review this literature by highlighting the aspects in which these alternative theories
diﬀer from the present study. Kaare Strom in a series of contributions (Strom, 1984, 1986, 1990)
provides an explanation of minority governments based on the inter-temporal trade-oﬀsp a r t i e s
face when considering their options for government participation. According to Strom, parties care
about both policies and oﬃce but gaining oﬃce immediately may not be optimal. In particular, by
“deferring gratiﬁcation” of their oﬃce aspirations, parties may avoid costly electoral consequences.
Thus, it may be rational to allow a minority government to form — particularly if parties are patient,
4have opportunities to inﬂuence policy in the legislature even if not present in the cabinet, and face
competitive elections.
There is also a diverse formal literature on minority governments that can be broadly classiﬁed
according to the approach (cooperative vs non-cooperative) and assumptions regarding parties’
preferences. Under the assumption that parties only care about the division of cabinet oﬃce,
both approaches converge to the conclusions of Riker, 1962, that only minimum winning coalitions
form and minority governments are impossible. Interestingly, this conclusion is no longer true in
a dynamic game with endogenous status quo for which there exist equilibria such that all cabinet
oﬃce eventually goes to a single party in each period (see Kalandrakis, 2003, 2004a).
Laver and Schoﬁeld, 1990,4 and Laver and Shepsle, 1996, deduce minority governments in
essentially cooperative frameworks by assuming, instead, that parties only care about policies and
are indiﬀerent about the spoils of oﬃce. In both accounts the emergence of minority governments
depends on the presence of either core or “strong parties,” which may or may not exist depending on
the dimensionality of the policy space and the conﬁguration of partisan preferences. For instance,
when non-trivial preferences are deﬁned over both the public policies pursued by the government
as well as over the division of the spoils of cabinet oﬃce, the number of dimensions becomes
prohibitively large for minority governments to emerge. Lastly, in the same cooperative mode
of analysis, Sened, 1995, assumes parties care about the spoils of oﬃce, but their utility varies
with policy outcomes only if they participate in the government, while they are indiﬀerent about
policies otherwise. This discontinuity produces instances when an (iv-)core exists that amounts to
a minority government.
Diermeier and Merlo, 2000, arrive at equilibrium minority governments in a rich model
that also addresses the stability of these governments. They work with three parties and a two-
dimensional policy space. Diermeier and Merlo assume utility is transferable which is an atypical
assumption given the public goods character of government policies. Utility transfers in their model
are not construed as the division of cabinet positions among parties and there is no such explicit
division. Thus, instead of identifying the cabinet by the observed government proposal, Diermeier
4See also Schoﬁeld, 1993, 1995.
5and Merlo deﬁne the cabinet coalition as the ‘proto-coalition’ that eventually oﬀers the ﬁnal gov-
ernment proposal. Baron and Diermeier, 2001, use a similar deﬁnition but restrict transfers only
among parties in the proto-coalition and do not obtain equilibrium minority governments.
Finally, we discuss models with the same assumptions as ours when it comes to parties’
payoﬀs such as Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988, Crombez, 1996, Kalandrakis, 2000, and Cho, 2003.
All involve a single policy dimension, three parties, and ﬁnite period bargaining protocols at the
government formation stage. In the ﬁrst of these models by Austen-Smith and Banks, minority
governments are not obtained in equilibrium because the authors assume in the outset that oﬃce
utility is large.5 Crombez, 1996, obtains equilibrium minority governments and associates the
phenomenon with the size of the median party. Kalandrakis, 2000, allows oﬃce utility to vary and
obtains equilibrium minority governments when the latter is small. Similarly, minority governments
emerge in the long-run in the dynamic model with an endogenous status quo and elections of Seok-
Ju Cho. We also mention the work of Jackson and Moselle, 2002, who study a version of the same
bargaining model as in our analysis with a single policy dimension, focusing on party rather than
government formation.
In the following section we present the theoretical model. In section 3, we elaborate on the
comparative statics result we wish to establish and present two counter-examples in which majority
governments form with probability one, independent of the level of utility from cabinet portfolios.
In section 4 we establish the advertised result. We conclude with section 5.
2. BARGAINING OVER GOVERNMENTS
In this section we present the framework for the analysis of coalition bargaining. We assume
a parliament consisting of n ≥ 3 parties and denote the set of these parties by N ≡ {1,...,n}.E a c h
party i ∈ N has a positive share of seats in parliament equal to si > 0,w i t h
Pn
i=1 si =1 .W e
assume that no single party controls a parliamentary majority, i.e. we have si ≤ 1
2 for all i ∈ N.
During government formation negotiations parties must decide on a policy x ∈ X.W e
5In that analysis minority governments form in subsequent rounds of bargaining that are not
r e a c h e di ne q u i l i b r i u m .
6assume X ⊂ Rd is a convex, compact subset of a d-dimensional Euclidean policy space, where
the number of policy dimensions d ≥ 1 can be arbitrarily large. The policy set X encompasses
all agreements reached by the government except the allocation of cabinet portfolios. Since it is
exactly the allocation of cabinet positions that allows us to distinguish between diﬀerent types of
governments in reality, we make this allocation an explicit choice in the model.
We represent cabinet allocations as divisions of a total amount G of cabinet portfolios among






i=1 gi = G
ª
. According to the above, we have the following deﬁnition of a
government:
Deﬁnition 1 A government is a pair (x,g) consisting of a policy x ∈ X, and an allocation of
cabinet portfolios g ∈ G.
We shall assume that parties have preferences over governments given by a function Ui :
X ×Rn
+−→ R. We assume that Ui (x,g) is additively separable in the policy and oﬃce components
and takes the following form:
Ui (x,g)=ui (x)+[ mi (gi)+cigi]
Although standard in this literature, the assumption of additive separability is not essential for our
arguments and can be signiﬁcantly relaxed as we discuss at the end of section 4.
We admit a wide class of preferences over policy decisions x ∈ X. In particular, we assume
that ui is smooth with negative deﬁnite second derivative, D2ui (x), for all i ∈ N,a n dt h a t
ui (x) > 0, x ∈ X. For reasons that will become immediate from our discussion in section 3, we
also assume that parties’ ideal policies diﬀer, i.e. there exists xi∈X for each i ∈ N (unique by
strict concavity) that maximizes ui over choices in X and xi 6= xj for all j 6= i, j ∈ N.F i n a l l y ,w e
make the assumption that the set of Pareto preferred policies, P (X) belongs in the interior of X,
P (X) ⊂ intX. This last assumption is merely for convenience and can be relaxed.
6Although in reality the number of portfolios is ﬁnite, a continuous approximation is legitimate
since the government agreement can, and often does, alter the jurisdiction or responsibilities of
each cabinet portfolio, eﬀectively inducing continuous divisions.
7Minority governments are paradoxical if cabinet allocations are desirable. Thus, when it
comes to preferences over cabinet portfolios we require mi to be smooth, concave, and strictly
increasing with gi so that m0
i > 0 for all i ∈ N. So, parties prefer larger share of cabinet positions
allocated to them and are indiﬀerent about the share of cabinets received by the remaining parties.
We set mi (0) = 0 and require m0
i (0) < +∞, i.e. the marginal utility from cabinet shares is
bounded from above at zero share of cabinets.
Preferences over cabinets also involve the additive linear term cigi and we assume ci ∈ R++,
i ∈ N. Clearly, we could have incorporated the term cigi into the function mi.7 Thus, our functional
speciﬁcation is more general than it appears. We make ci (c for cabinet) an explicit parameter that
enables us to “perturb” parties’ cabinet preferences. These preference parameters ci, i ∈ N will
serve to make precise the notion that minority governments occur generically.
To be invested, governments must receive the assent of a set of parties with a majority of
seats in parliament. We thus deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 2 Ac o a l i t i o nC ⊆ N is a winning coalition if the sum of seat shares of the constituent
parties exceeds one-half, i.e.
P
j∈C sj > 1
2.
We assume a standard Baron & Ferejohn, 1989, bargaining process. In each period t =1 ,2,...
before the attainment of an agreement party i becomes the formateur with constant probability πi.
When party i is the formateur in period t, it proposes a government. If this proposal is accepted
by a winning coalition C ⊆ N, the game ends with the formation of that government. Otherwise
the game moves to the next period and continues as above until an agreement is reached. We
will assume that parties discount the future with a discount factor δi ∈ (0,1], i ∈ N.T h u s , i f a
government (x,g) is invested in period t, parties’ payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb yδt−1
i Ui (x,g).
The fact that the allocation of cabinet oﬃce is explicit in the model, allows us to distinguish
minority governments by the default empirical criterion, i.e. whether cabinet portfolios are allocated
only among parties with a minority of seats in parliament:
Deﬁnition 3 A government (x,g) ∈ X × G is a minority government if the set of parties that
7In particular, every concave, strictly monotonic function b m(g) can be represented by a function
m(g)+cg satisfying our assumptions (and vice versa).
8receive positive share of cabinets is not a winning coalition, i.e.
n X
h=1
shIR++ (gh) ≤ 1
2.
Of course, if a government (x,g) is not a minority government, then it is a majority govern-
ment. Trivially, if there are no cabinets to be allocated (G =0 ) then all governments are minority
governments. The distinction becomes non-trivial when G>0.
To complete the description of the model, we shall impose (minimal) requirements with regard
to recognition probabilities. We preface these restrictions with a deﬁnition. In particular, among
parliamentary parties we single out the class of dummy parties.
Deﬁnition 4 Party i ∈ N is a dummy party if for all winning coalitions C with i ∈ C, CÂ{i} is
also a winning coalition.
Not all parliaments contain dummy parties,8 but if they do these parties are not created (and
certainly will not be treated) equal in what follows. In particular, we set πi =0for all dummy
parties. On the other hand, we assume all parties that are not dummy parties have some positive
probability πi > 0, maybe arbitrarily small, of becoming formateurs to lead coalition negotiations.
Of course, we have these probabilities satisfy
Pn
i=1 πi =1 .
We now have speciﬁed the model which is summarized by a vector of seat shares for the parties
s, a vector of recognition probabilities π, utility functions ui and mi for each i ∈ N,t h el e v e lo f
cabinet spoils G, and preference parameters δi and ci, i ∈ N. We represent the latter with vectors
δ ∈ (0,1]
n and c ∈ Rn
++, respectively. Our arguments in what follows trace the eﬀect of changes
on cabinet spoils G, and rely on perturbations of parameters δ,c. For notational convenience,
we denote games satisfying our assumptions by Γ(G,δ,c). This notation highlights our focus on
changes of parameters G,δ,c, while implicitly holding the remaining aspects of the model ﬁxed.
We shall restrict our analysis to the study of stationary subgame perfect (SSP) equilibria. Since
SSP equilibria form a subset of the set of subgame perfect equilibria, minority governments can
8One example is a four-party parliament with three parties having 0.3 share of seats. The fourth
party is a dummy party.
9certainly emerge in a subgame perfect equilibrium if they can emerge in a stationary equilibrium.
Thus, the restriction to stationary strategies makes our task harder in what follows.
A stationary proposal strategy for party i is a probability distribution over governments in
X×G.Astationary voting strategy for party i is a set of governments Ai ⊂ X×G which this party
approves. Given stationary proposal and voting strategies, we calculate the continuation value of
party i, vi,a st h eexpected utility if government negotiations continue in the next period.W er e s t r i c t
voting strategies, so that parties accept governments if and only if they weakly prefer them over
their discounted continuation value.9 An SSP equilibrium is no delay i fa l lp r o p o s a ls t r a t e g i e sa r e
such that all proposed governments are invested.
We can readily check that this government formation model satisﬁes the assumptions of
Banks and Duggan, 2000. As a consequence, no-delay SSP equilibria exist. Furthermore, the set of
these equilibria changes upper-hemicontinuously10 with the model’s parameters.
Theorem 1 For every government formation game Γ(G,δ,c):
(a) a no-delay SSP equilibrium exists, and
(b) the set of no-delay SSP equilibria is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence of G.
Proof. (a) Banks & Duggan, 2000, theorem 1, page 78. (b) Banks & Duggan, 2000, theorem
3, page 81. In particular, G, is a preference parameter of the type assumed in that theorem. To
see this, consider an equivalent game where parties split a ﬁxed dollar of size 1. Denote possible
divisions by y such that
Pn
i=1 yi =1and assume utility, U∗
i ,g i v e nb yU∗
i (x,y)=Ui (x,Gy).
Note that the game may (and in general does) admit multiple no-delay SSP equilibria.
3. COMPARATIVE STATICS & COUNTER-EXAMPLES
As we outlined in the introduction, we wish to study the incidence of equilibrium minority
governments for game Γ(G,δ,c) in relation to the magnitude of cabinet spoils parameter G.T h i s
9Formally, in equilibrium, we require (x,g) ∈ Ai ⇐⇒ Ui (x,g) ≥ δivi, i ∈ N.
10Upper-hemicontinuity is one possible generalization of the continuity property of functions to
correspondences. A correspondence ϕ : X ⇒ Y, Y compact, is upper-hemicontinuous at x ∈ X if for
every pair of convergent sequences xk −→ x ∈ X and yk → y with yk ∈ ϕ(xk),w eh a v ey ∈ ϕ(x).
10would amount to a typical comparative statics exercise except for the fact that we do not analyze
departures from a speciﬁc (or unique) equilibrium of the game Γ(G,δ,c). The potential multiplicity
of equilibria of game Γ(G,δ,c) requires that we make statements about the manner the entire
equilibrium set behaves as we change G.11
In view of the need to cast our comparative statics statements in terms of the entire equilib-
rium set, we formalize the eﬀect of changes in cabinet spoils, G, as follows. First, we shall show
that there exists some level of cabinet spoils G>0 such that only majority governments form in all
no-delay SSP equilibria of game Γ(G,δ,c) for all G>G. Conversely, when it comes to minority
governments, we wish to show that there exists some G > 0 with G≤ G such that for all G< G
minority governments form with positive probability in all no-delay SSP equilibria of the game.
The above formalization implies that larger utility from oﬃce (or relatively smaller political
disagreement) leads to majority governments, while minority governments are guaranteed to emerge
when the opposite holds. Figure 1 displays a graphical illustration of the result we aim to establish.
[insert ﬁgure 1 here]
The signiﬁcant complication arises, though, that the statement that minority governments
are guaranteed to emerge for suﬃciently low G>0 cannot be true for all versions of the model
we described in section 2. In particular, we shall provide two examples of government formation
games that have the property that for all levels of G>0 there exist stationary equilibria in which
majority governments form with probability one.
The ﬁrst of the two examples is consistent with and highlights intuition for the proposed
theory:
Example 1 Let parties’ preferences, Ui, satisfy the assumptions of the model except assume that
ideal policy points coincide, i.e. xi = x∗ for all i ∈ N.L e tδi =1for all i ∈ N.
11Another alternative would be to analyze the local behavior of speciﬁc equilibria as we change
G; but this presumes that equilibria are locally unique. Unfortunately, this has been established
to be true (generically) only for the subset of pure strategy equilibria of such games (Kalandrakis,
2004b).
11Equilibrium: Since ideal policy points coincide, in every SSP equilibrium all governments
implement policy x∗ ∈ X. Thus, for every level of G>0,p a r t i e se ﬀectively bargain only over the
division of a dollar. Since πi > 0 for all non-dummy parties, the reservation value, vi,f o rt h e s e
parties is always larger than the utility from the policy x∗,i . e . vi >u i (x∗) when G>0.A s a
result, all non-dummy parties that approve governments must be receiving cabinet portfolios. Thus,
all governments are majority governments for all SSP equilibria and all levels of G>0.
Since policy disagreement is absent in example 1, bargaining revolves exclusively around the
allocation of cabinet portfolios and the game becomes a “divide-the-dollar” game similar to Baron
and Ferejohn, 1989. Thus, the equilibrium outcome should come as no surprise. In some sense, any
size of cabinet spoils G is “large” in the absence of policy disagreement and, as the theory suggests,
minority governments are impossible in equilibrium.
In the next example we shall show that, even if political disagreement is present, it is possible
to obtain equilibria without minority governments for all positive levels of cabinet oﬃce, G>0.
Since this example meets all of our assumptions in section 2, it forces us to pursue the genericity
arguments we elaborate in section 4.
Example 2 Let the space of policies be of dimension two (d =2 )w i t hX =[ −1,1]
2. Assume four
parties (n =4 ) with equal share of seats in parliament si = 1











+ gi, i =1 ,...,4
where k is a suﬃciently large positive constant. Parties’ ideal policy points, xi, are given by x1 =
(0,1), x2 =( 1 ,0), x3 =( 0 ,−1),a n dx4 =( −1,0). Probabilities of recognition and discount factors
are identical and given by πi = 1
4 and δi =1for all i ∈ N, respectively.12
Equilibrium, G =0 : There exists a continuum of SSP equilibria such that party 1 proposes
x =( 0 ,α),p a r t y2x =( α,0),p a r t y3x =( 0 ,−α),a n dp a r t y4x =( −α,0), for every α ∈ [0,1]
(see Banks and Duggan, 2000, example 6, page 83).
12The term cigi is implicitly incorporated in the linear term .... +gi. This counter-example can be
appropriately modiﬁed to allow for discount factors less than unity, in which case the equilibrium
when G =0is locally unique.
12Equilibrium, G>0: For every level of G>0 there exists a SSP equilibrium such that













































.I n d e e d ,w i t h
these proposal strategies, parties’ continuation values are given by:




4 , i =1 ,...,4
By symmetry, to verify that the above proposals form an SSP, it suﬃces to check the optimality
of the government proposed by party 1. Given that party 3 is the most expensive coalition partner,





2 − (x2 − 1)
2 + G − g2 − g4
´
s.t.
k − (x1 − 1)
2 − (x2)
2 + g2 ≥ v2
k − (x1 +1 )
2 − (x2)
2 + g4 ≥ v4
gi ≥ 0,i=2 ,4
G ≥ g2 + g4







optimal policy proposal must satisfy
−2x1 − 2(x1 − 1) − 2(x1 +1 ) = 0 (1)
−2(x2 − 1) − 2x2 − 2x2 =0 (2)
Hence, x1 =0 , x2 = 1






is indeed an optimal government proposal and the
equilibrium holds.
In view of example 2, our task in what follows is considerably harder than typical. In
particular, the claim that low cabinet utility G results to equilibrium minority governments can be
true only in a subset of the model’s parameters, not for all possible versions of the model. At best
we can hope to show that the advertised comparative static holds generically, i.e. models that fail
the desired property have (Lebesgue) measure zero in the space of parameters.
13An insight as to why example 2 may not be generic can be obtained by noticing the following
feature of the equilibrium correspondence with respect to G ≥ 0. For all majority governments
when G>0 in the model, equilibrium policies are determined by equations analogous to those in
(1) and (2). These equations produce unique policy compromises that are weighted averages of
coalition parties’ ideal points, where the weights depend on the marginal utility from extra cabinet
portfolios. This fact follows from eﬃciency considerations peculiar to majority governments and is
made precise in lemma 3 of section 4.
Yet, if we study the version of the game without cabinet portfolios (G =0 ) there is no
reason to expect that equilibrium policies will coincide with these eﬃcient policy compromises of
majority coalitions. Indeed, without cabinet spoils (G =0 ) there are no transfers in the form of an
exchange of portfolio positions to induce eﬃcient trades among parties in the remaining government
decisions. Certainly, equilibrium policies when G =0are independent of parties’ marginal utility
from cabinet positions.
[insert ﬁgure 2 about here]
Example 2 is not generic because in it we have an unlikely coincidence between the eﬃcient




















form both optimal majority coalition policies
and SSP equilibrium policies when G =0 . This coincidence makes it possible for the equilibrium
correspondence, which is depicted in ﬁgure 2, to be (upper hemi)continuous at G =0without
minority governments forming for any G>0.
But if we appropriately perturb model parameters in this example, we can ensure that eﬃcient
majority policies do not coincide with policies proposed in any SSP equilibrium when G =0 .F o r
instance, if party 1 had smaller marginal utility from cabinet positions (lower c1), then the optimal
majority policy for minimum winning coalition {1,2,3}13 would be closer to that party’s ideal




, ε,η 6=0 . Obviously, such a change in parameter c1 does not aﬀect








being the eﬃcient majority
13Obtained by equations similar to (1) and (2).
14policy compromise of coalition {1,2,3}, either party 2 must cease proposing majority governments
as G tends to zero, or the set of SSP equilibria must change discontinuously at G =0 .S i n c et h e
latter contradicts the continuity of the equilibrium (theorem 1, part b) minority governments must
form with positive probability at some level of G>0.
In light of the above discussion, our result relies on the generic non-coincidence between
the eﬃcient majority government policies and the equilibrium policies when cabinet portfolios are
absent (G =0 ). To facilitate the demonstration of the disparity between these two sets of policies,
it is useful (not necessary) to know that the version of the game without cabinet portfolios (when
G =0 ) does not produce manifold equilibrium points. This is shown to be true generically14 in
the space of discount factors for the pure strategy equilibria of these games by Kalandrakis, 2003b.
As we shall show, focusing on the pure strategy SSP equilibria at G =0is suﬃcient to prove the
desired comparative static. We pursue these arguments more rigorously in the next section.
4. GENERICITY OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS
We shall start our analysis by showing that we can ensure that majority governments occur
with probability one in all SSP equilibria by increasing the size of cabinet spoils, G.L o o s e l y
speaking, the argument relies on the fact that parties’ expected utility if a government proposal is
rejected, i.e. their continuation value, is increasing with G. Since utility from policies x ∈ X, is
bounded from above, there exists some level of continuation value above which parties must receive
cabinets in order to approve a government. Thus, for large enough G, all parties that are approving
governments must be receiving strictly positive fractions of cabinets.
We state this and the remaining formal resul t si nt h i ss e c t i o na n dm o v ea l lp r o o f si nt h e
Appendix.
Proposition 1 Consider government formation game Γ(G,δ,c).T h e r e e x i s t s G such that for
every G>G, all equilibrium governments are majority governments in all no-delay, SSP equilibria
of game Γ(G,δ,c).
14Incidentally, not in the case of example 2.
15Proof. See the appendix.
The hard task in what follows will be to show that there exist strictly positive levels of G such
that minority governments are guaranteed to occur with positive probability in all SSP equilibria.
Given example 2, our objective is to show that this is true for a subset of the model’s parameters
that has full (Lebesgue) measure in the space of parameters.
We start with a characterization of the policies that are implemented by majority governments
in equilibrium. This result follows simply from the optimization considerations of formateurs.
Lemma 1 If party i proposes a majority government (x,g) ∈ X × G in an SSP equilibrium with
equilibrium continuation values given by (v1,...,v n) ∈ Rn, and the set of parties receiving cabinets
for government (x,g) is C ≡ {j ∈ N : gj > 0},t h e ni ∈ C and






¢−1 Duj (x)=0, (3)
(ii) for all j ∈ C \{ i}
Uj (x,g)=δjvj, j ∈ C \{ i} (4)
Proof. See the appendix.
The equations15 in (3) are generalizations of equations (1) and (2) in example 2. Note that
the unique solution of equation (3) depends (besides the majority coalition C) on the allocation of
cabinets g ∈ G which is implicitly determined by parties’ equilibrium continuation values. Denote
the solution to the equations in (3) that correspond to cabinet allocation g and a coalition of
portfolio recipient parties C by xC
g ∈ intX.
With the above we can outline more concretely the basic argument in the main proposition.
Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that for all G>0 there exists some SSP equilibrium such
that majority governments form with probability one. For each such SSP equilibrium, proposed
policies satisfy equation (3). But, as G goes to zero, cabinet proposals g in these equilibria also go
to 0 ∈ Rn. By continuity of the equilibrium (theorem 1, part b), we deduce that at G =0there
15The number of equations is d ≥ 1.





∈ X × G,a n dp o l i c y
proposals xC
0 satisfy equations (3) and (4).
We use lemma 2 below to show that for almost all parameters c ∈Rn
++ such a limit SSP
equilibrium must be in pure strategies.
Lemma 2 Consider distinct majority coalitions C, C0, and a vector of continuation values (v1,...,v n) ∈
Rn. If, for these continuation values, distinct policies xC
0,xC0
0 ∈ X and g = 0 solve equations (3)










except for a set of Lebesgue measure
zero in the space of parameters c ∈Rn
++.
Proof. See the appendix.
The argument in lemma 2 is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. This ﬁgure displays a two-dimensional
policy space and the ideal policy points of members of two winning coalitions with party i belonging
in both coalitions. The two highlighted policy points display the eﬃcient majority policies that
satisfy equation (3) for these two coalitions and g = 0.I ff o rs o m ev e r s i o no ft h em o d e lt h e s e
policies fall on the indiﬀerence contour representing party i’s policy preferences, ui,t h e np a r t yi is
indiﬀerent between these two policies when g = 0,s i n c eUi (x,0)=ui (x), i ∈ N.Y e t ,t h e r ei sa
perturbation of a subset of preference parameters c ∈Rn
++ that ensures that one of the two policies
is strictly preferred by party i, instead. Thus, for almost all parameters c ∈Rn
++,p a r t yi cannot be
mixing between these policies in an equilibrium with G =0 .
[insert ﬁgure 3 about here]
Now, the equilibria of the game when G =0do not depend on parameters c ∈Rn
++.A l s o ,
the number of pure SSP equilibria when G =0is ﬁnite for almost all discount factors δ ∈(0,1]
n
(Kalandrakis, 2004). On the other hand, policies xC
0 that solve equations (3) depend on (at least
one) of the parameters c ∈Rn
++. Thus, except for a set of measure zero of parameters c ∈Rn
++,w e
can ensure that all possible equilibrium policies in the set of pure strategy SSP equilibria when
G =0do not coincide with any of the policies of the form xC
0.
From the above, for almost all parameters (δ,c) ∈ (0,1]
n × Rn
++, the limit equilibrium in
pure strategies that we deduce exists at G =0by entertaining the hypothesis that only majority
17governments prevail for some equilibrium of game Γ(G,δ,c) for every G>0, does not coincide
with any of the pure strategy equilibria of this game when G =0 . This implies that at G =0we
must have a discontinuity of the equilibrium set, contradicting theorem 1, part b, hence we obtain
the desired result.
[insert ﬁgure 4 about here]
A graphic illustration of this argument is depicted in Figure 4. We state the result formally
as follows:
Proposition 2 Except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero of parameters (δ,c) ∈ (0,1]
n × Rn
++,
there exists G with G > 0 such that for all G<Gin all no-delay, SSP equilibria of government
formation game Γ(G,δ,c) minority governments form with strictly positive probability.
Proof. See the appendix.
We emphasize the generality of the result in Propositions 1 and 2, which hold for all admissible
speciﬁcations of parameters s, π, and utility functions ui, mi.
Separability between Policies and Cabinet Oﬃce
Perhaps the only substantively important restriction we have imposed has to do with the
additive separability of preferences for policies and cabinet allocations, Ui (x,g). This restriction
may be important, for example, if we entertain the possibility that cabinet spoils tied to particular
cabinet positions imply some type of direct or automatic public goods policy implication. Another
example of a situation in which separability may be restrictive is the case when cabinet allocations
to speciﬁc coalitions or combinations of parties aﬀect or interact with the utility these parties
receive from speciﬁc policies x ∈ X.16
Fortunately, our argument can be generalized considerably, relaxing additive separability to
admit substantive interactions such as the ones we describe in the above examples. For instance,
16Interactions of the type we describe above are implicit in some of the arguments of, for instance,
Baron and Diermeier, 2001, Diermeier and Merlo, 2000, or Laver and Shepsle, 1996, etc.
18the proof in proposition 2 holds without modiﬁcation if we allow a general functional form Ui (x,g)
a n ds i m p l yr e q u i r et h a t
∂Ui(x,g)
∂gi is independent of x ∈ X at g = 0. In other words, our proof relies
on a very limited form of separability that holds only at the level of cabinet allocations g = 0.
Without even being necessary, this much weaker assumption allows us to accommodate a wealth
of interaction eﬀects between policies x, and positive cabinet allocations g 6= 0.
5. CONCLUSIONS
With considerable generality we have derived a theory for the emergence of minority gov-
ernments in multi-party parliamentary systems using a sequential bargaining model of coalition
formation in the tradition of Baron and Ferejohn, 1989. We derived a comparative static to the
eﬀect that minority governments are (for almost all parameters) guaranteed to emerge when utility
from cabinet posts is small, or when policy disagreement or polarization is signiﬁcant. On the
other hand, only majority governments form when the opposite is true, ceteris paribus. Besides
anecdotal evidence or traditional intuition in comparative politics (e.g. Dodd, 1976) that supports
our ﬁnding, Warwick, 1998, provides systematic evidence to the eﬀect that the probability that
minority governments form increases with policy polarization.
A tt h ec o r eo ft h em e c h a n i s mw ep r o p o s ei st h ef a c tt h a tt h ee ﬃcient policy compromises of
majority governments diﬀer from policy compromises that would emerge in a counter-factual situ-
ation when (due, for example, to constitutional or other restrictions) cabinet oﬃce is not available
to be distributed among parliamentary parties. It follows, as a result of this disparity, that when
oﬃce utility is small it is impossible for all parties in the winning coalition to be compensated with
cabinet positions in order for this winning coalition to reach the eﬃcient majority government com-
promise. The conﬁguration of parties’ bargaining power in equilibrium is such that some parties
are willing to approve proposed governments and policies without receiving cabinet portfolios. As
a result, minority governments emerge.
Besides being general, our theory of minority governments is also parsimonious in some
regards. For example, we do not need to assume that there exist parties that are either located at
t h ec o r eo ft h ep o l i c ys p a c eo rt h a ta r es i m i l a r l yc entrally located ‘strong’ parties (e.g. Laver &
19Schoﬁeld, 1990, Laver and Shepsle, 1996, etc.). Importantly, our argument holds for policy spaces
of arbitrarily large dimension. Furthermore, we do not introduce inter-temporal calculations such
as the presence of future electoral costs from participation in government, or considerations about
the ability of extra-cabinet parties to inﬂuence policies outside the cabinet as in the theory of
Strom. To the degree that such additional assumptions are valid in actual parliaments, they form
the basis for complementary, alternative explanations to the one we provide.
The essence of our argument admits further generalization. In particular, our result follows
from two equilibrium properties: (a) the disparity between bargaining compromises when cabinet
oﬃce is absent and the corresponding policy compromises when majority cabinets form, and (b) the
fact that the equilibrium set changes continuously with the size of oﬃce utility. Our conclusions
extend directly to alternative government formation bargaining models, that satisfy these two
properties.
One straightforward generalization involves the related model of Banks and Duggan, 2003,
who relax the assumption that agreements are desirable by adding a status quo policy that is
implemented in each period coalition negotiations fail.17 Focusing on alternative bargaining proto-
cols, Baron and Diermeier, 2001, and Diermeier and Merlo, 2000, propose a bargaining game that
allows formateur parties to select proto-coalitions which negotiate over agreements prior to the
resultant government being presented for an overt or tacit investiture vote. It seems likely that for
this and similar extensive forms the necessary continuity of the equilibrium correspondence holds.
As a consequence, our conclusions may follow directly for such and other alternative bargaining
protocols.
On a methodological note, our study presents an instance of a (possibly) intuitive theory that
is surprisingly hard to prove in view of the counter-examples we provide in section 3. Indeed, our
analysis required certain ‘deep,’ abstract theoretical results about the behavior of the equilibrium
set of bargaining games of government formation. We believe that the epistemological signiﬁcance of
theorems about the continuity or local uniqueness of equilibria of such games should alone warrant
them a place in the modern study of politics. But our (unanticipated) application of these results
17Note that the two models are identical in the case discount factors δi =1 , for all i ∈ N.
20also demonstrates their ‘usefulness’ even to sceptics that demand immediate applications from such
theoretical studies.
APPENDIX
In this appendix we provide the proofs of the lemmas and propositions from section 4. We
start with proposition 1:
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Deﬁne ui ≡ max{ui (x):x ∈ X}.W eﬁrst claim that:
(1) If δivi is the discounted continuation value of party i ∈ N in an SSP equilibrium and
δivi > ui for all i ∈ N, then all equilibrium governments are majority governments. Suppose
not. Then there exists equilibrium proposal (y,g) ∈ X × G with gj =0for some j ∈ C ⊂ N,
where C is the set of parties approving government (y,g).T h e nUj (y,g)=uj (y) ≥ δjvj > uj,a
contradiction.
We shall next show that:
(2) For each i ∈ N with πi > 0,t h e r ee x i s t sGi such that G>Gi =⇒ δivi > ui in every
SSP equilibrium. Let ui ≡ min{ui (x):x ∈ X}.I f(y,g) ∈ X ×G is the expected value calculated
from the lottery over proposals in an SSP equilibrium, we have δjvj ≤ Uj (y,g),f o ra l lj ∈ N,
due to the concavity of uj and mj. For government (y,g) there exists h 6= i such that gh ≥ gj
for all j ∈ N\{i}, i.e. h is the party with the highest expected cabinet allocation among parties





G. Thus, proposal (y,w) ∈ X × G with wj = gj if





G is approved by all legislators but h. Hence, in







n−1, when proposing. Thus, in






















.S i n c eπi > 0, δi ∈ (0,1],a n dm0













> ui for all G>Gi.A s a r e s u l t , G>Gi =⇒ δivi > ui
and we have completed the proof of step (2).
Set G =m a x
©
Gi | i ∈ N
ª
.W en o wh a v eG>G =⇒ δivi > ui for all i ∈ N, by step (2). But
in every SSP equilibrium, only majority governments form for G>G, by step (1), and the proof
21of the proposition is complete.
Next we prove lemma 1.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Part (ii) follows from the fact that m0
h (gh)+ch > 0, h ∈ N.
Speciﬁcally, if Uj (x,g) > δjvj, j ∈ C \{ i}, then by the continuity of Uj (x,g) it is possible to
reduce gj and increase gi (and party i’s utility) with the new government still being invested.
Similarly, if Uj (x,g) < δjvj, j ∈ C \{i} then it is possible to set gj =0and increase gi (and party
i’s utility) with the new government still being invested.
To show part (i) note that the above arguments and the fact that i is not a dummy party
ensure that i ∈ C, i.e. the proposing party is included among the parties receiving cabinets. Thus,
i’s government proposal must solve the program
max
x,g Ui (x,g) subject to
Uj (x,g) ≥ δjvj,j∈ C \{ i}





Since the Pareto set with regard to policies is a subset of the interior of X, P (X) ⊂ int(X),w e






θj (Uj (x,g) − δjvj)+µjgj
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+ µj − θ =0 ,j∈ C \{ i}
θj (uj (x)+mj (gj)+cjgj − δjvj)=0 ,j∈ C \{ i}



















uj (x)+mj (gj)+cjgj − δjvj =0 ,j∈ C \{ i}




Thus, given that m0







uj (x) which is a weighted sum of players’ utilities. Hence, x is unique and
belongs in the interior of X.
We now prove lemma 2:
P r o o fo fl e m m a2 . Since xC
0 , xC0






∈ (intX × intX) − ∆,
where ∆ is the diagonal of intX × intX.S i n c e(intX × intX) − ∆ is an open set, it is a smooth
manifold of dimension twice the dimension of manifold intX. By equation (4) and the fact that





















can be true only for a set of Lebesgue measure zero in the space of
23parameters c ∈ Rn
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=0are inconsistent outside a set of
Lebesgue measure zero in the space of parameters c ∈ Rn
++.
Of course, af o r t i o r i ,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that a subset of these equations are generically
inconsistent. We shall work with |C
T

































=0 , for one j ∈ C
\
C0
We view each of these |C
T
C0| subsets as a set of 2d +1equations with ‘unknowns’ the policies
xC
0 , xC0
0 and the |C ∪ C0| parameters ch, h ∈ C ∪ C0 that belong in R
|C∪C0|
++ .
Deﬁne the mapping Fj :( intX × intX − ∆) × R
|C∪C0|
++ −→ R2d+1, to be the left-hand side of
the above equations. Fj, j ∈ C
T
C0, is a smooth mapping between smooth manifolds since mh,
uh are smooth. We shall show that 0 ∈R2d+1 is a regular value of Fj, for at least one j ∈ C
T
C0.
As a result, the pre-image of 0, F−1
j (0), that constitutes the set of solutions to the equations
Fj (·)=0 is a (2d + |C ∪ C0|) − (2d +1 )=( |C ∪ C0| − 1)-dimensional manifold by the Preimage
theorem (Guilemin and Pollack, 1974, page 21). This is one dimension smaller than the space of
parameters {ci}i∈C∪C0 ∈ R
|C∪C0|
++ and, as a consequence, the equations Fj (·) = 0 (and supersets
of these equations) are consistent only for a set of Lebesgue measure zero of the parameters ch,
h ∈ C ∪ C0.
Recall that 0 is a regular value of Fj if and only if the Jacobian of Fj evaluated at x, DFj (x),
has full rank for every x ∈F−1
j (0). In what follows we index parties using the convention q ∈ C\C0,
24h ∈ C0 \ C,a n dl ∈ (C ∪ C0 − {j}). Calculating the Jacobian DFj (x) using the order of variables













l yl ... −w−2
q yq ... 0 ...
0 B −w−2
j zj −w−2





































,a n dwk = m0
k (0)+ck, k ∈ C∪C0.N o t et h a tb yo u ra s s u m p t i o n swk > 0, k ∈ C∪C0.
We must also have that equations (3) are valid for xC
0,xC0




































l yl ... w−1
q yq ... 0 ...
0 Bw −1
j zj w−1








Since A, B are negative deﬁnite, this matrix has full rank if and only if the 1 ×| C ∪ C0| matrix














l yl ... w−1
q yq ... 0 ...
w−1
j zj w−1











j A−1yl − w−1
l zT
j B−1zl ... w−1
q yT




h a sr a n k1 .T h u st op r o v et h el e m m ai ts u ﬃces to show that there exists at least one j ∈ C
T
C0
such that at least one of the |C ∪ C0| elements of the matrix Mj is non-zero.
Suppose Mj = 0 for all j ∈ C
T
C0 instead. Then we have w−1
q yT
j A−1yq =0for all q ∈ C\C0
and all j ∈ C
T
C0, and we can obtain (by summing equations w−1
q yT







































= 0.( 7 )




















Since (7) and (8) imply that xC
0, xC0







j (0) + cj
´−1
uj (x),w em u s th a v exC
0 = xC0
0 , a contradiction emanating from the work-
ing hypothesis that Mj = 0 for all j ∈ C
T
C0. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Lastly, in order to prove proposition 2, we make use of the following result:
Theorem 2 (Kalandrakis, 2004b) For almost all discount factors δ ∈[0,1]
n t h en u m b e ro fp u r e
strategy, stationary, no-delay equilibria of game Γ(0,δ,c) is ﬁnite (possibly zero).
We now state the proof of proposition 2:
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix any s,π,ui,m i, i ∈ N, consistent with our assumptions.
Assume (to show a contradiction for almost all δ,c) that for some game Γ(G,δ,c) there is no
G> 0 such that minority governments form with positive probability in all SSP equilibria when
0 ≤ G< G . In other words, the working hypothesis is that for each G>0 there exists some
G0 with G>G 0 > 0 for which an SSP equilibrium exists with all proposed governments being
majority coalitions. Then, we can construct a sequence Gk with Gk > 0, Gk −→ 0 and a sequence
of associated SSP equilibria ek with ek −→ e,s u c ht h a ta l lg o v e r n m e n t sp r o p o s e di ne a c hek are
majority governments. We can immediately deduce:
(1) For all c ∈ Rn
++, δ ∈ (0,1]
n, the limit e of the sequence of SSP equilibria ek i san od e l a y ,
SSP equilibrium of the game Γ(0,δ,c). This follows immediately from the upper-hemicontinuity
of the equilibrium correspondence (theorem 1, part b).
(2) For almost all c ∈ Rn
++, the equilibrium e i ns t e p1i si np u r es t r a t e g i e s . This follows
from lemma 2, the fact that for each i ∈ N there exists a ﬁnite number of possible pairs of distinct
minimum winning coalitions C,C0 with i ∈ C
T
C0,a n dt h ef a c tt h a tﬁnite unions of sets of measure
zero have measure zero.
26(3) The proposal oﬀered by non-dummy party i ∈ N in pure strategy SSP equilibrium e of
s t e p2i sap o l i c yxC
0 that satisﬁes (3) for one of the ﬁnite number of minimum winning coalitions
C ⊂ N, i ∈ C. This follows from the working hypothesis that in the sequence of equilibria ek only
majority governments are proposed and from lemma 1.
(4) For almost all discount factors δ ∈ (0,1]
n, the possible proposals oﬀered by non-dummy







possibly zero). This follows from theorem 2.






in step 4, do
not depend on parameters c ∈ Rn
++. But by lemma 1, the ﬁnite number of policies xC
0 in step 3,
do depend on c ∈ Rn
++. In particular, since parties’ ideal policy points diﬀer, for each minimum
winning coalition C that includes i, the solutions to (3), xC
0, can be perturbed by at least |C| − 1
parameters. Then for almost all c ∈ Rn






such that x = xC
0 for all
minimum winning coalitions C such that i ∈ C. Thus, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero
of parameters c ∈ Rn
++, δ ∈ (0,1]
n, we have a contradiction of step 1 emanating from the working
hypothesis.
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Key: Since the bargaining game may admit multiple equilibria, it is possible that in some 
intermediate range of cabinet spoils (G, G) a subset of equilibria involve minority 
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Key: For all G > 0, there is an equilibrium in which all four parties propose majority 
governments. At G = 0 there is a continuum of pure strategy SSP equilibria, including 
one in which proposed policies coincide with the policies proposed in the SSP equilibria 
when G > 0.  Figure 3: Graphic Illustration of Lemma 2 
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C x0  represents the efficient majority compromise for coalition C = {i, j, l, h} 
and cabinet allocation g = 0, while policy 
C x
′
0  represents the respective compromise for 




0  to 
C x
′ ′ 0 ) that ensures that the two policies do not fall on the same 
indifference contour of party  C C i ′ ∈ I .Figure 4: Minority Governments & Proposition 2.  
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Key: If majority governments form with probability one in a sequence of equilbria as the 
size of G goes to zero, then we deduce a failure of upper-hemicontinuity at G = 0 for 
almost all parameters of the model. 
 